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systems
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Abstract— This paper considers competitive mobility-on-
demand systems where a group of vehicle sharing companies
provide pickup-delivery service in populated areas. The compa-
nies, on one hand, want to collectively regulate the traffic of the
user queueing network, and on the other hand, aim to maximize
their own net profit at each time instant by increasing the
user delivery and reducing the transition of empty vehicles. We
formulate the strategic interconnection among the companies as
a real-time game theoretic coordination problem. We propose
an algorithm to achieve vehicle balance and practical regulation
of the user queueing network. We quantify the relation between
the regulation error and the system parameters (e.g., the
maximum variation of the user arrival rates).
I. INTRODUCTION
Private automobiles are not a sustainable solution to per-
sonal mobility given their drawbacks of energy inefficiency,
high greenhouse gas emissions and induced traffic conges-
tion. The report [20] shows that in 2010, traffic congestion
caused an annual cost of 101 billion, and drivers spent 4.8
billion hours in traffic in United States. Mobility-on-demand
(MoD) systems represent a promising paradigm for future
urban mobility. In particular, MoD systems are one-way
vehicle-sharing systems where vehicle-sharing companies
provide sharing vehicles at stations in a geographic region
of interest, and users drive or are driven by the vehicles
from a pickup location to a drop-off location. Several pilot
programs have empirically demonstrated that MoD systems
are efficient in addressing the drawbacks of private automo-
biles. In MoD system, the arrivals and departures of users
are uncorrelated, so it is important to real-time reallocate the
vehicles to match the dynamic and spatial demands. In this
paper, we focus on competitive MoD systems where multiple
service suppliers compete with one another to maximize
their own profits. The paper [18] instead studies the scenario
where there is a single service supplier.
Literature review. Networked resource allocation among
competing users has been extensively studied in the context
of Game Theory. In [2], the authors exploit differential game
theory to derive Nash equilibrium controllers for multiple
self-interested users to regulate the traffic of a single queue.
However, the approach in [2] is not applicable to our problem
due to; e.g, the additional dynamics of vehicle queues, the
nonlinearity and non-smoothness of dynamic systems and
the presence of state and input constraints. Static games
The authors are with Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cam-
bridge, MA 02139, {mhzhu,frazzoli}@mit.edu. This research
was supported in part by the Future Urban Mobility project of the Singapore-
MIT Alliance for Research and Technology (SMART) Center, with funding
from Singapore’s National Research Foundation.
have also been widely used to synthesize decentralized
schemes for resource allocation, and a necessarily incomplete
reference list includes [1], [13], [16], [21], [23]. Another
relevant problem is demand response in the emerging smart
grid where customers manage their electricity consumption
in response to supply conditions. Some references on the
regard include [8], [12].
Our problem is also related to (open-loop) optimization
and games in dynamic environments. In [5], the authors
study the problem of seeking the common global optimum
of a sequence of time-varying functions. The papers [6],
[7] investigate resource allocation of communication systems
over time-varying fading channels. The online convex opti-
mization and games have been considered in the papers [11],
[24].
Another set of papers relevant to our work is concerned
with generalized Nash games. This class of continuous
games are first formulated in [3]. Since then, a great ef-
fort has been dedicated to investigating the existence and
structural properties of generalized Nash equilibria. An in-
complete reference list includes the recent survey paper [9]
and [4], [10], [19]. There have been several algorithms
proposed to compute generalized Nash equilibria, including
ODE-based methods [19], nonlinear Gauss-Seidel-type ap-
proaches [17], iterative primal-dual Tikhonov schemes [21]
and best-response dynamics [15]. In our recent paper [22],
we consider distributed computation of generalized Nash
equilibria over unreliable communication networks.
Contributions. In this paper, we present a model of com-
petitive MoD systems and formulate the problem of real-
time game theoretic coordination among multiple players
(i.e., vehicle sharing companies). In particular, each player
wants to collectively regulate the traffic of the user queueing
network through delivering the users to their destinations. On
the other hand, each player aims to maximize his net profit at
each time instant by increasing the user delivery and reducing
the transition of empty vehicles. We propose an algorithm
to achieve vehicle balance and practical regulation of the
user queueing network. The closed-loop system consists of
a feedback connection of the cyber and physical layers: in the
cyber layer, the players seek instantaneous Nash equilibrium
in a distributed fashion; the intermediate estimates of Nash
equilibrium are employed to control the physical queueing
networks after a proper projection; the states of the queueing
networks are injected into the cyber layer to keep track of
Nash equilibrium. We quantify the relation between the reg-
ulation error and the system parameters (i.e., the maximum
variation of the user arrival rates). For ease of presentation,
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the notations of Sections III and IV will be introduced and
summarized in the Appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we will provide a model for competitive
MoD systems and introduce the problem formulation con-
sidered in the paper. Basic notations used in this section are
summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
BASIC NOTATIONS
cκ(t) user arrival rate at station κ
v
[i]
κ (t) number of vehicles of player i at station κ
β
[i]
κ (t) delivery rate of player i at station κ
α
[i]
κκ′ (t) transfer rate of empty vehicles of player i
Qκ(t) queue length of station κ
uκ(t) controller of station κ
1 indicator function
Bi profit function of player i
Ci cost function of player i
A. Model
A competitive MoD system consists of three intercon-
nected networks: the user queueing network, the vehicle
queueing network and the player network. Figure 1 shows
the architecture of the system.
Fig. 1. A competitive MoD system where the companies of shared electrical
vehicles and bicycles serve the area
1) The user queueing network: There is a set of stations,
say S, in a spatial area of interest, and the interconnection of
the stations is characterized by the graph GS , {S, ES} where
(κ, κ′) ∈ ES\diag(S) if and only if the users at station κ can
be delivered to station κ′. The graph GS is fixed, undirected
and connected. Denote by Nκ , {κ′ ∈ S | (κ, κ′) ∈ ES} the
set of neighboring stations of station κ.
Users arrive at station κ ∈ S in a dynamic fashion. Let
cκ(t) ∈ R≥0 be the user arrival rate at station κ at time t, and
its temporal evolution is governed by the following ordinary
differential equation:
c˙κ(t) = hκ(cκ(t), Qκ(t), t). (1)
In (1), Qκ(t) is the queue length of station κ and will be
defined later. The function hκ : R3≥0 → R≥0 is locally
Lipschitz in (cκ(t), Qκ(t)) and piecewise continuous in t.
Let aκκ′(t) ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of users who arrive at
station κ at time t and want to reach station κ′ 6= κ. Thus∑
κ′∈Nκ aκκ′(t) = 1. We assume that the fraction aκκ′(t) is
fixed; i.e., aκκ′(t) = aκκ′ for t ≥ 0.
A queue is associated with each station κ ∈ S, and the
arrived users wait for the delivery in the queue. Let Qκ(t) ∈
R≥0 be the queue length of station κ ∈ S at time t, and it
dynamics is given by:
Q˙κ(t) = (cκ(t)− uκ(t))1[Qκ(t)≥0], (2)
where the initial state Qκ(0) > 0, and the quantity uκ(t) =∑
i∈V β
[i]
κ (t) ∈ R≥0 where β[i]κ (t) is the delivery rate of
player i at station κ and V , {1, · · · , N} is the set of
players explained later.
Denote the vectors Q , (Qκ)κ∈S, c , (cκ)κ∈S, ξ , (Q, c)
and u , (uκ)κ∈S. We then rewrite (1) and (2) into the
following compact form:
Q˙(t) = hQ(c(t), u(t)), (3)
c˙(t) = hc(c(t), Q(t), t). (4)
and then,
ξ˙(t) = hξ(ξ(t), u(t), t). (5)
2) The vehicle queueing network: There is a group of
players V , {1, · · · , N}. Each player is a vehicle-sharing
company, and he provides the service of delivering the users
on the graph GS. Let v[i]κ (t) ∈ R≥0 be the number of vehicles
of player i stored at station κ at time t. If v[i]κ (t) > 0, then
player i is able to deliver the users leaving station κ at a rate
β
[i]
κ (t) ∈ [a, β[i]max − a] with 0 < a < 12β[i]max1; otherwise,
player i cannot deliver any user; i.e., β[i]κ (t) = 0. In order to
avoid v[i]κ (t) becoming zero, each player i needs to reallocate
his empty vehicles. Let α[i]κκ′(t) ∈ [a, α[i]max − a] with 0 <
a < 12α
[i]
max be the rate that the empty vehicles of player i
are transferred from station κ to station κ′ at time t. The
dynamics of v[i]κ (t) is based on the mass-conservation law
and given by:
v˙[i]κ (t) = {−β[i]κ (t) +
∑
κ′∈Nκ
aκ′κβ
[i]
κ′ (t)
−
∑
κ′∈Nκ
α
[i]
κκ′(t) +
∑
κ′∈Nκ
α
[i]
κ′κ(t)}1[v[i]κ (t)>0]
+ {
∑
κ′∈Nκ
aκ′κβ
[i]
κ′ (t) +
∑
κ′∈Nκ
α
[i]
κ′κ(t)}1[v[i]κ (t)=0],
(6)
with the initial state v[i]κ (0) > 0. It is easy to verify that
v
[i]
κ (t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0.
1The quantity a > 0 could be chosen arbitrarily small.
3) The player network: Each player in V has three
partially conflicting objectives: the first one is to collectively
regulate the queue length Qκ(t) to the desired level Q¯κ ∈
R>0, the second one is to maintain v
[i]
κ (t) to be strictly
positive, and the third one is to maximize his own net profits.
In the sequel, we will explain each objective in more detail.
Firstly, players aim to collectively regulate the queue
length Qκ(t) to the desired level Q¯κ. For the time being,
we assume that there exists a smooth controller U(ξ(t)) ,
(Uκ(ξκ(t)))κ∈S which is able to achieve the queue regula-
tion. Hence, players share a common goal of enforcing the
controllers uκ(t) = Uκ(ξκ(t)) for all κ ∈ S.
Secondly, each player i wants to maintain v[i]κ (t) > 0
in order to sustain a non-trivial service rate β[i]κ (t) > 0.
Since v[i]κ (0) > 0, player i can achieve this goal through
simply keeping v[i]κ (t) as a constant; i.e., enforcing the hard
constraint v˙[i]κ (t) = 0 all the time.
Thirdly, each player is self-interested and desires to max-
imize his net profit at each time instant. In particular, each
player i is able to make a profit from the delivery service,
and the profit is modeled by Bi(β[i]κ (t)) where the function
Bi : R≥0 → R≥0 is smooth and strongly concave with
constant ρi > 0. On the one hand, the transfer of empty
vehicles is costly, and the expense is modeled by Ci(α[i]κκ′(t))
where Ci : R≥0 → R≥0 is smooth and strongly convex
with constant ρ′i > 0. The net cost of player i at time t is
abstracted by
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES Ci(α
[i]
κκ′(t))−
∑
κ∈S Bi(β[i]κ (t)).
The decision vector of player i at time t is given by z[i](t)
which is the collection of α[i](t) , (α[i]κκ′(t))(κ,κ′)∈ES and
β[i](t) , (β[i]κ (t))κ∈S. The above three interests of player i
at time t are compactly expressed by the following convex
program parameterized by the vector U(ξ(t)):
min
z[i](t)∈Rni
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
Ci(α[i]κκ′(t))−
∑
κ∈S
Bi(β[i]κ (t)),
s.t.
∑
i∈V
β[i]κ (t) = Uκ(ξκ(t)), κ ∈ S,
− β[i]κ (t) +
∑
κ′∈Nκ
aκ′κβ
[i]
κ′ (t)−
∑
κ′∈Nκ
α
[i]
κκ′(t)
+
∑
κ′∈Nκ
α
[i]
κ′κ(t) = 0, κ ∈ S,
z[i](t) ∈ Zi, (7)
where the dimension ni = |S|+2|ES| and the set Zi is defined
as: Zi , {z[i] | β[i]κ ∈ [a, β[i]max − a], κ ∈ S, α[i]κκ′ ∈
[a, α
[i]
max − a], (κ, κ′) ∈ ES}. In (7), the decisions of
the players are coupled via the constraint
∑
i∈V β
[i]
κ (t) =
Uκ(ξκ(t)) which represents the common goal of the queue
regulation. Other components in (7) are instead separable.
By using v(x) = 0 if and only if v(x) ≤ 0 and v(x) ≥
0, we rewrite the parametric convex program (7) into the
following compact form:
min
z[i](t)∈Rni
fi(z
[i](t)),
s.t. G(β[i](t), β[−i](t), U(ξ(t))) ≤ 0,
h[i](z[i](t)) ≤ 0, z[i](t) ∈ Zi, (8)
where G : RN |S| → Rm (m = 2|S|) and h[i] : Rni → Rp
(p = 2|S|) are affine functions. The components of G and
h[i] are asymmetric; i.e., G` = −G`+|S| and h[i]` = −h[i]`+|S|
for 1 ≤ ` ≤ |S|. The collection of (8) will be referred to as
the CVX game parameterized by U(ξ(t)), and its solution,
Nash equilibrium, is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1: For the CVX game parameterized by
U(ξ(t)), the state z˜(t) ∈ Z ,∏i∈V Zi is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if:
(1) G(β˜(t), U(ξ(t))) ≤ 0 and h[i](z˜[i](t)) ≤ 0;
(2) for any z[i] ∈ Zi with G(β[i], β˜[−i](t), U(ξ(t))) ≤ 0
and h[i](z[i]) ≤ 0, it holds that fi(z˜[i](t)) ≤ fi(z[i]).
The set of Nash equilibria is denoted by XC(ξ(t)). Since fi
is strongly convex and separable, the map of partial gradients
is strongly monotone, and thus XC(ξ(t)) is non-empty; e.g.,
in [9].
B. Our objective
At each time instant t, the players aim to solve the CVX
game parameterized by the control command U(ξ(t)), and
implement a Nash equilibrium in XC(ξ(t)). This procedure is
repeated at the next time instant by shifting the time horizon
forward. We term the collection of these finite-horizon games
over the infinite horizon as a real-time game. In this paper,
we will design an algorithm to update z(t) such that real-
time game theoretic coordination is achieved; that is,
lim
t→+∞dist(z(t),XC(ξ(t))) = 0,
lim
t→+∞Qκ(t) = Q¯κ, κ ∈ S,
v[i]κ (t) = v
[i]
κ (0), κ ∈ S, i ∈ V, t ≥ 0. (9)
Remark 2.1: In contrast to [2], [4], our real-time game
theoretic coordination formulation relaxes the computation of
infinite-horizon Nash equilibrium. Instead, our formulation
aims to real-time seek the collection of instantaneous Nash
equilibrium. By Lemma 6.1, one can see that if z(t) asymp-
totically achieves XC(ξ(t)), then the infinite-horizon average
performance of z(t) is identical to that of XC(ξ(t)). More
importantly, the formulation allows us to handle constrained
discontinuous dynamic systems and relax the a priori infor-
mation of the arrival rates over the infinite horizon.
Our game formulation is partially motivated by receding-
horizon control or model predictive control; e.g., in [14],
whose control laws are based on solving a sequence of finite
horizon optimal control problems. Our game formulation is
also partially inspired by optimization and games in dynamic
environments; e.g., in [5], [6], [11]. However, this set of
papers only consider open-loop decision making. •
C. Assumptions
Let βmax ,
∑
i∈V β
[i]
max, αmax ,
∑
i∈V α
[i]
max. In the
remainder of this paper, we suppose that the following set
of assumptions hold.
Assumption 2.1: It holds that β[i]max are identical for all
i ∈ V and cκ(t) ∈ [cmin, cmax] for all t ≥ 0 and κ ∈ S. In
addition, 2Na ≤ cmin < cmax < βmax −Na.
Assumption 2.2: There is δc > 0 such that ‖c˙κ(t)‖ ≤ δc
for all κ and t ≥ 0.
Assumption 2.3: For any β[i] with β[i]κ ∈ [a, β[i]max − a],
there is α[i] such that α[i]κκ′ ∈ [a, α[i]max−a] and the following
holds for κ ∈ S:
−β[i]κ +
∑
κ′∈Nκ
aκ′κβ
[i]
κ′ −
∑
κ′∈Nκ
α
[i]
κκ′ +
∑
κ′∈Nκ
α
[i]
κ′κ = 0.
Assumption 2.1 requires that the maximum delivery rate
is larger than the maximum arrival rate. This assumption is
necessary for the queue stabilization. Assumption 2.2 means
that the variations of the arrival rates are bounded. The
combination of Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 implies that there is
δξ > 0 such that ‖ξ˙(t)‖ ≤ δξ for all t ≥ 0. Assumption 2.3
implies that given any feasible delivery vector β[i], each
player i is able to maintain the vehicle balance at different
stations. Since GS is undirected, this assumption requires that
α
[i]
max is large enough in comparison with β
[i]
max.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In the sequel, we will first introduce an approximation of
the CVX game parameterized by ζ(t) , U(ξ(t)), namely,
the regularized game. In order to simplify the notations,
we will drop the dependency of ζ(t) on time t. We will
then characterize the distance between the CVX game and
the regularized game. After this, we will perform sensitivity
analysis on the regularized game.
A. The existence of smooth controllers
With Assumption 2.1, we will show that the regulation
of user queues can be achieved via the following smooth
controller:
uκ(t) = Uκ(ξκ(t)) = cκ(t)− Uˆκ(Qκ(t))
, cκ(t)− cmin
2
+
βmax − cmax + cmin2 −Na
1 + 2βmax−cmax−Nacmin e
−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ)
.
(10)
Towards this end, it is easy to verify that Uˆκ(Q¯κ) = cκ(t)
and Uκ(ξκ(t)) ∈ [ cmin2 , βmax −Na] ⊆ [Na, βmax −Na] by
utilizing the monotonicity of the functions in Uˆκ. Hence, the
controller Uκ(ξκ(t)) is realizable for the players. Further-
more, the Lie derivative of the regulation error 12 (Qκ(t) −
Q¯κ)
2 along (2) for Qκ(t) ≥ 0 is given by:
1
2
d
dt
(Qκ(t)− Q¯κ)2 = (Qκ(t)− Q¯κ)Uˆκ(Qκ(t))
=
βmax − cmax −Na
1 + 2βmax−cmax−Nacmin e
−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ)
× (Qκ(t)− Q¯κ)(e−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ) − 1). (11)
So, (Qκ(t) − Q¯κ)Uˆκ(Qκ(t)) < 0 for Qκ(t) − Q¯κ 6= 0 and
Qκ(t) ≥ 0. Hence, Uκ(ξκ(t)) is able to regulate Qκ(t) to
Q¯κ from any initial state Qκ(0) > 0. This controller will be
used in the remainder of the paper. In the sequel, we will
find uniform upper bounds on ‖dU(ξ)dξ ‖ and ‖d
2U(ξ)
dξ2 ‖.
Lemma 3.1: The following holds for all ξ ≥ 0:
‖dU(ξ)
dξ
‖ ≤ D(1)U , ‖
d2U(ξ)
dξ2
‖ ≤ D(2)U . (12)
Proof: Notice that
dUκ(ξκ)
dQκ
=
βmax − cmax + cmin2 −Na
(1 + 2βmax−cmax−Nacmin e
−(Qκ−Q¯κ))2
× (−2)(βmax − cmax −Na)
cmin
e−(Qκ−Q¯κ),
d2Uκ(ξκ)
dQ2κ
=
(βmax − cmax + cmin2 −Na) 2(βmax−cmax−Na)cmin
(1 + 2βmax−cmax−Nacmin e
−(Qκ−Q¯κ))4
× (1− (2(βmax − cmax −Na)
cmin
e−(Qκ−Q¯κ))2)
× e−(Qκ−Q¯κ),
dUκ(ξκ)
dcκ
= 1.
The above relations in conjunction with e−(Qκ−Q¯κ) ∈
[0, eQ¯κ ] establish the desired bounds.
B. The regularized game
1) Regularized Lagrangian functions: To relax the con-
straints of G(β, ζ) ≤ 0 and h[i](z[i]) ≤ 0, we define the
following regularized Lagrangian function for player i:
Li(z, µ, λ[i], ζ) = fi(z[i]) + 〈µ,G(β, ζ)〉+ 〈λ[i], h[i](z[i])〉
− τ
∑
κ∈S
(
ψ(β[i]κ ) + ψ(β
[i]
max − β[i]κ )
)
− τ
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
(
ψ(α
[i]
κκ′) + ψ(α
[i]
max − α[i]κκ′)
)
− 
2
‖µ‖2 − 
2
‖λ[i]‖2 + τ
m∑
`=1
ψ(µ`) + τ
p∑
`=1
ψ(λ
[i]
` ), (13)
with  > 0, τ > 0 and µ ∈ Rm and λ[i] ∈ Rp are dual
multipliers. The function ψ is the logarithmic barrier function
and defined as follows:{
ψ(s) = log( sa ), s > 0,
ψ(s) = −∞, s ≤ 0.
Note that ψ is concave and monotonically increasing over
R>0. In Li, the hard constraints µ` ≥ 0, λ[i]` ≥ 0 and
z[i] ∈ Zi are relaxed by those defined via the logarithmic
function. In addition, the terms associated with  play a role
of regularization as shown in Lemma 3.2.
We then introduce a set of dual players {0} ∪ Vm ,
{1, · · · , N}, and µ is the decision vector of dual player 0,
and λ[i] is the decision vector of dual player i. Each primal
player i ∈ V aims to minimize Li over z[i] ∈ Rni . Each dual
player i ∈ Vm desires to maximize Li over λ[i] ∈ Rp and
dual player 0 wants to maximize H(z, µ, ζ) , 〈µ,G(β, ζ)〉−

2‖µ‖2 + τ
∑m
`=1 ψ(µ`). This game is referred to as the
regularized game (RG game, for short) parameterized by ζ
and the definition of its NEs is given as follows:
Definition 3.1: The state (z˜, µ˜, λ˜) ∈ Rn+m+p is a Nash
equilibrium of the RG game parameterized by ζ if and only
if the following hold for each primal player i ∈ V :
Li(z˜, µ˜, λ˜[i], ζ) ≤ Li(z[i], z˜[−i], µ˜, λ˜[i], ζ), ∀z[i] ∈ Rni ,
the following hold for each dual player i ∈ Vm:
Li(z˜, µ˜, λ[i], ζ) ≤ Li(z˜, µ˜, λ˜[i], ζ), ∀λ[i] ∈ Rp,
and the following hold for dual player 0:
H(z˜, µ, ζ) ≤ H(z˜, µ˜, ζ), ∀µ ∈ Rm.
The set of NEs of the RG game parameterized by ζ is
denoted as XRG(ζ). Since the logarithmic barrier function ψ
penalizes µ /∈ Rm≤0 an infinite cost, thus it must be µ˜(ζ) >
0 for any NE η˜(ζ) ∈ XRG(ζ). Analogously, λ˜[i](ζ) > 0,
β˜
[i]
κ (ζ) ∈ (0, β[i]max) and α˜[i]κκ′(ζ) ∈ (0, α[i]max) for any NE
η˜(ζ) ∈ XRG(ζ).
2) Convexity of the RG game: Since fi is strongly convex
in z[i] and ψ is concave over R>0, then Li is strongly convex
in z[i] ∈ Zˆi , {z[i] ∈ Rni | β[i]κ ∈ [0, β[i]max], κ ∈
S, α[i]κκ′ ∈ [0, α[i]max], (κ, κ′) ∈ ES} with constant
min{ρi, ρ′i}. By introducing the quadratic perturbation of

2‖λ[i]‖2, the function of Li(z, µ, ·, ζ) is strongly concave
in λ[i] with constant  over Rp>0. This can be verified via
the following computation:
d2Li
d(λ
[i]
` )
2
= −− τ
(λ
[i]
` )
2
< −. (14)
Analogously, the function of H(z, µ) is strongly concave in
µ with constant  over Rm>0.
3) Monotonicity of the RG game: It is noted that all the
functions involved in Li are smooth in Zˆ×Rm>0×Rp>0. We
then define ∇z[i]Li(z, µ, λ[i], ζ) : Zˆ × Rm>0 × Rp>0 → Rni
as the partial gradient of the function Li(·, z[−i], µ, λ[i], ζ) at
z[i]. Other partial gradients can be defined in an analogous
way. Let η , (z, µ, λ), and define the map ∇Ω : Zˆ ×
Rm>0 ×Rp>0 → Rn+m+p as partial gradients of the player’s
objective functions:
∇Ω(η, ζ)
,
[∇z[1]L1(z, µ, λ[1], ζ)T . . .∇z[N]LN (z, µ, λ[N ], ζ)T
−∇µH(z, µ, ζ)T
−∇λ[1]L1(z, µ, λ[1], ζ)T · · · − ∇λ[N]LN (z, µ, λ[N ], ζ)T
]T
.
The following lemma shows that the quadratic perturba-
tions of 2‖µ‖2 and 2‖λ[i]‖2 regularize the game map ∇Ω
to be strongly monotone over Zˆ ×Rm+p>0 .
Lemma 3.2: The regularized game map ∇Ω(η, ζ) is
strongly monotone over Zˆ × Rm+p>0 with constant ρΩ =
min{mini∈V {ρi, ρ′i}, }. In addition, there is a unique NE
η˜(ζ) ∈ XRG(ζ).
Proof: Pick any pair of η, η¯ ∈ Zˆ×Rm+p>0 . Since G and
h[i] are affine, one can verify that
〈∇Ω(η, ζ)−∇Ω(η¯, ζ), η − η¯〉
≥
∑
i∈V
〈∇z[i]fi(z[i])−∇z[i]fi(z¯[i]), z[i] − z¯[i]〉
+ ‖µ− µ¯‖2 + 
∑
i∈V
‖λ[i] − λ¯[i]‖2 +B1 +B2 +B3,
(15)
where the terms of B1, B2 and B3 are given by:
B1 , −τ
∑
i∈V
∑
κ∈S
(
1
β
[i]
κ
− 1
β¯
[i]
κ
)(β[i]κ − β¯[i]κ )
+ τ
∑
i∈V
∑
κ∈S
(
1
β
[i]
max − β[i]κ
− 1
β
[i]
max − β¯[i]κ
)(β[i]κ − β¯[i]κ ),
B2 , −τ
∑
i∈V
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
(
1
α
[i]
κκ′
− 1
α¯
[i]
κκ′
)(α
[i]
κκ′ − α¯[i]κκ′)
+ τ
∑
i∈V
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
(
1
α
[i]
max − α[i]κκ′
− 1
α
[i]
max − α¯[i]κκ′
)(α
[i]
κκ′ − α¯[i]κκ′),
B3 , τ
m∑
`=1
(log(µ`)− log(µ¯`))(µ` − µ¯`)
+ τ
∑
i∈V
p∑
`=1
(log(λ
[i]
` )− log(λ¯[i]` ))(λ[i]` − λ¯[i]` ).
By using the monotonicity of functions in B1, B2, B3, it is
readily to verify that B1, B2, B3 ≥ 0. Apply the mean-value
theorem for vector functions and fi is strongly convex with
constant min{ρi, ρ′i} to (15). We then reach the desired result
that ∇Ω is strongly monotone over Zˆ×Rm+p>0 with constant
ρΩ. The strong monotonicity of ∇Ω ensures the existence
and uniqueness of NE in XRG(ζ); i.e., in [9].
C. Approximation errors of the RG game
As mentioned before, in the RG game, the hard constraints
µ` ≥ 0, λ[i]` ≥ 0 and z[i] ∈ Zi are relaxed by those
defined via the logarithmic function. Hence, the RG game is
completely unconstrained. This will allow us to characterize
the sensitivity of the RG game on ζ. However, the RG game
is merely an approximation of the CVX game. We now move
to characterize how good this approximation is.
By the convexity or concavity of Li on its components,
the following first-order conditions hold for the unique NE
η˜(ζ) ∈ XRG(ζ):
∇z[i]Li(z˜, µ˜, λ˜[i], ζ) = 0, ∇λ[i]Li(z˜, µ˜, λ˜[i], ζ) = 0,
∇µH(z˜, µ˜, ζ) = 0. (16)
These relations are explicitly expressed as follows:
∇
β
[i]
κ
fi(z˜
[i]) +
m∑
`=1
µ˜`∇β[i]κ G`(β˜, ζ) +
p∑
`=1
λ˜
[i]
` ∇β[i]κ h
[i]
` (z˜
[i])
− τ
β˜
[i]
κ
+
τ
β
[i]
max − β˜[i]κ
= 0, κ ∈ S, (17)
∇
α
[i]
κκ′
fi(z˜
[i]) +
p∑
`=1
λ˜
[i]
` ∇α[i]
κκ′
h
[i]
` (z˜
[i])
− τ
α˜
[i]
κκ′
+
τ
α
[i]
max − α˜[i]κκ′
= 0, (κ, κ′) ∈ ES, (18)
µ˜` −G`(β˜, ζ)− τ
µ˜`
= 0, ` = 1, · · · ,m, (19)
λ˜
[i]
` − h[i]` (z˜[i])−
τ
λ˜
[i]
`
= 0, ` = 1, · · · , p. (20)
Since µ˜`, λ˜
[i]
` > 0, solving (19) and (20) renders the
following:
µ˜
[i]
` = g(G
[i]
` (β˜, ζ)) > 0, λ˜
[i]
` = g(h
[i]
` (z˜
[i])) > 0. (21)
The following proposition verifies that the RG game can
be rendered arbitrarily close to the CVX game by choosing
a pair of sufficiently small  and τ . In particular, (P1) and
(P2) show that the violation of equality constraints is at most
max{ςh(, τ), ςG(, τ)} = o(, τ). (P3) implies that the cost
at the NE η˜(ζ) is o(τ)-suboptimal. (P4) and (P5) provide a
set of bounds on NEs.
Proposition 3.1: The unique NE η˜(ζ) ∈ XRG(ζ) is an
approximation of XC(ζ) in the following way:
(P1) |h[i]κ (z˜[i])| ≤ ςh(, τ);
(P2) |Gκ(β˜)| ≤ ςG(, τ);
(P3) The following holds for any z[i] ∈ Zi with
G(β[i], β˜[−i], ζ) ≤ 0 and h[i](z[i]) ≤ 0:
fi(z˜
[i]) ≤ fi(z[i]) + τ(p+m)
+ 2τ(|S| log(β[i]max) + |ES| log(α[i]max)).
(P4) It holds that for i ∈ V :
g(−ςG(, τ)) ≤ µ˜κ(ζ) ≤ g(ςG(, τ)),
g(−ςh(, τ)) ≤ λ˜[i]κ (ζ) ≤ g(ςh(, τ)).
(P5) It holds that
τβ
[i]
max
2τ + δ′iβ
[i]
max
≤ β˜[i]κ ≤ β[i]max −
τβ
[i]
max
2τ + δ′iβ
[i]
max
,
τα
[i]
max
2τ + δ′′i α
[i]
max
≤ α˜[i]κκ′ ≤ α[i]max −
τα
[i]
max
2τ + δ′′i α
[i]
max
.
Proof: In order to simplify the notations, we drop the
dependency on the parameter ζ unless necessary.
Claim 1: (P1) holds.
Proof: Since η˜ is an NE, then the following holds for
any z[i] ∈ Rni :
Li(z˜, µ˜, λ˜i)− Li(z[i], z˜[−i], µ˜, λ˜i) ≤ 0,
that is,
fi(z˜
[i]) + 〈µ˜, G(β˜)〉+ 〈λ˜[i], h[i](z˜[i])〉
− τ
∑
κ∈S
(
ψ(β˜[i]κ ) + ψ(β
[i]
max − β˜[i]κ )
)
− τ
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
(
ψ(α˜
[i]
κκ′) + ψ(α
[i]
max − α˜[i]κκ′)
)
≤ fi(z[i]) + 〈µ˜, G(β[i], β˜[−i])〉+ 〈λ˜[i], h[i](z[i])〉
− τ
∑
κ∈S
(
ψ(β[i]κ ) + ψ(β
[i]
max − β[i]κ )
)
− τ
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
(
ψ(α
[i]
κκ′) + ψ(α
[i]
max − α[i]κκ′)
)
. (22)
Choose βˆ[i] = β˜[i]. By Assumption 2.3, there is αˆ with
αˆ
[i]
κκ′ ∈ [a, α[i]max − a] such that h[i](zˆ[i]) ≤ 0. Substitute zˆ[i]
into (22), and we have
fi(z˜
[i]) + 〈λ˜[i], h[i](z˜[i])〉
− τ
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
(
ψ(α˜
[i]
κκ′) + ψ(α
[i]
max − α˜[i]κκ′)
)
≤ fi(zˆ[i]) + 〈λ˜[i], h[i](zˆ[i])〉
− τ
∑
(κ,κ′)∈ES
(
ψ(αˆ
[i]
κκ′) + ψ(α
[i]
max − αˆ[i]κκ′)
)
. (23)
Notice that the last two terms on the right-hand side of (23)
are non-positive. So it follows from (23) that
〈λ˜[i], h[i](z˜[i])〉 ≤ δi. (24)
By (20), it is easy to see that λ˜[i]κ h
[i]
κ (z˜[i]) are lower
bounded by −τ . Substitute these relations into (24), and it
gives that
λ˜[i]κ h
[i]
κ (z˜
[i]) ≤ δi + (p− 1)τ, (25)
Consider the first case of h[i]κ (z˜[i]) ≥ 0. Substitute (21)
into (25), and it renders that
2h[i]κ (z˜
[i])2 ≤ h[i]κ (z˜[i])2 + h[i]κ (z˜[i])
√
h
[i]
κ (z˜[i])2 + 4τ
≤ 2(δi + (p− 1)τ).
Hence, h[i]κ (z˜[i]) ≤ ςh(, τ).
Consider the second case of h[i]κ (z˜[i]) ≤ 0. By the
asymmetry of the components in h[i], there is κ′ 6= κ such
that h[i]κ (z˜[i]) = −h[i]κ′(z˜[i]) and h[i]κ′(z˜[i]) ≥ 0. Follow the
above steps, and we have h[i]κ′(z˜
[i]) ≤ ςh(, τ). Hence, we
have h[i]κ (z˜[i]) ≥ −ςh(, τ). The combination of the above
two cases establishes (P1).
Claim 2: (P2) holds.
Proof: Pick any 1 ≤ κ ≤ |S| and let κ′ = κ+ m2 . Then
Gκ(β˜) = −Gκ′(β˜).
Consider the first case of Gκ(β˜) ≥ 0. Recall that∑
i∈V β˜
[i]
κ − ζκ = Gκ(β˜). So there exists i ∈ V such that
1
N (ζκ +Gκ(β˜)) ≤ β˜[i]κ . Choose βˆ[i] such that βˆ[i]κ = ζκN and
βˆ
[i]
κ′ = β˜
[i]
κ′ for κ
′ 6= κ. Recall that ζκN ∈ [a, βmaxN −a]. Hence,
βˆ
[i]
κ ∈ [a, β[i]max − a]. By Assumption 2.3, there is αˆ[i] such
that αˆ[i]κ ∈ [a, α[i]max − a] and h[i](zˆ[i]) ≤ 0.
By (21) and Gκ(β˜) = −Gκ′(β˜), we have µ˜κ − µ˜κ′ =
1
Gκ(β˜). Hence, we have
〈µ˜, G(β˜)−G(βˆ)〉
= µ˜κ(Gκ(β˜κ)−Gκ(βˆ)) + µ˜κ′(Gκ′(β˜κ′)−Gκ′(βˆ))
= µ˜κ
Gκ(β˜)
N
+ µ˜κ′(−Gκ(β˜)
N
) =
Gκ(β˜)
2
N
. (26)
Recall that λ˜[i]κ h
[i]
κ (z˜[i]) ≥ −τ . Substitute zˆ[i] into (22),
and it gives that Gκ(β˜)2 ≤ N(δi + pτ). Hence, Gκ(β˜) ≤√
N(δi + pτ) when Gκ(β˜) ≥ 0.
Analogous to Claim 1, we have Gκ(β˜) ≥
−√N(δi + pτ) when Gκ(β˜) ≤ 0. The combination
of the above two cases establishes (P2).
Claim 3: (P3) holds.
Proof: It is a result of the relation (22).
Claim 4: (P4) holds.
Proof: It is easy to verify that the first-order derivative
g′(s) = g(s)√
s+
√
s2+4τ
> 0 and the second-order derivative
g′′(s) = 2s
2+4τ
(s2+4τ)
3
2
> 0. Hence, the function g is strictly
increasing and strictly convex. From (21) and (P1), we
establish the desired bounds on µ˜κ and λ˜
[i]
κ .
Claim 5: (P5) holds.
Proof: It is noted that
‖∇
β
[i]
κ
fi(z˜
[i]) +
m∑
`=1
µ˜`∇β[i]κ G`(β˜, ζ) +
p∑
`=1
λ˜
[i]
` ∇β[i]κ h
[i]
` (z˜
[i])‖
≤ sup
z[i]∈Zi
‖∇
β
[i]
κ
fi(z
[i])‖+
m∑
`=1
‖µ˜`‖+
p∑
`=1
‖λ˜[i]` ‖ ≤ δ′i.
(27)
Assume β˜[i]κ <
τβ[i]max
2τ+δ′iβ
[i]
max
<
β[i]max
2 . Then we have
δ′i −
τ
β˜
[i]
κ
+
τ
β
[i]
max − β˜[i]κ
< δ′i −
τ
β˜
[i]
κ
+
2τ
β
[i]
max
≤ 0.
This contradicts (17). So it must be β˜[i]κ ≥ τβ
[i]
max
2τ+δ′iβ
[i]
max
. The
remainder of (P5) can be shown in an analogous way.
It completes the proof for Proposition 3.1.
Remark 3.1: The bounds on β[i]κ and α[i]κκ′ are shifted by
a, and the argument in ψ is scaled by a. In this way the last
two terms on the right-hand side of (23) are non-positive for
any z[i] ∈ Zi. •
D. Sensitivity analysis
As mentioned before, the RG game is completely uncon-
strained. This allows us to perform sensitivity analysis on the
RG game, and characterize the variation of the NE η˜(U(ξ))
induced by the variation of ξ. In this part, we will drop the
dependency of the NE η˜(ζ) on ζ unless necessary.
Toward this end, we denote a set of matrices as follows:
R1(η˜) ,
 ∇
2
z[1]z[1]
L1 · · · ∇2z[1]z[N]L1
...
. . .
...
∇2
z[1]z[1]
LN · · · ∇2z[N]z[1]LN
 ,
R2 ,
 ∇z[1]G1(β˜, ζ)
T · · · ∇z[1]Gm(β˜, ζ)T
...
. . .
...
∇z[N]G1(β˜, ζ)T · · · ∇z[N]Gm(β˜, ζ)T
 ,
R3 , diag([∇z[i]h[i]1 (z˜[i])T , · · · ,∇z[i]h[i]p (z˜[i])T ])i∈V ,
R4(η˜) , diag(+
τ
µ˜2`
)`=1,··· ,m,
R5(η˜) , diag(diag(+
τ
(λ˜
[i]
` )
2
)`=1,··· ,p)i∈V .
Recall that G and h[i] are affine. Then ∇z[j]Li = 0 if
i 6= j. Since Li is separable in its components, thus R1(η˜, ζ)
is diagonal, symmetric and positive definite. In addition, R2
and R3 are constant due to G and h[i] being affine.
With the above notations at hand, we can derive the partial
derivative of the left-hand side of (16) with respect to η˜
evaluated at (η˜, ζ), and this derivative is given by:
JM (η˜) ,
 R1(η˜) RT2 RT3−R2 R4(η˜) 0
−R3 0 R5(η˜)
 .
Let JN be the partial derivative of the left-hand side
of (17) to (20) with respect to ζ. Since G is affine in ζ,
then JN is state-independent. We then denote
J(η˜) , JM (η˜)−1JN , (28)
where JM (η˜)−1 will be shown to be non-singular in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.3: The matrix JM (η˜(ζ)) is non-singular, posi-
tive definite and its spectrum is uniformly lower bounded by
mini∈V {ρi, ρ′i} > 0. In addition, J(η˜(ζ)) is continuously
differential in ζ, and the following relation holds:
dη˜(U(ξ(t)))
dt
= J(η˜(U(ξ(t))))
dU(ξ(t))
dξ(t)
ξ˙(t). (29)
Proof: Recall the following identity for non-singular
A1:[
A1 A2
A3 A4
]
=
[
A1 0
A3 I
] [
I A−11 A2
0 A4 −A3A−11 A2
]
.
(30)
By (30), the determinant of JM (η˜) is computed as follows:
det(JM (η˜)) = det
[
R4(η˜) 0
0 R5(η˜)
]
det(T1(η˜)),
where T (η˜) is given by:
T1(η˜) , R1(η˜) + T2(η˜)
, R1(η˜) + [RT2 RT3 ]
[
R4(η˜) 0
0 R5(η˜)
]−1 [
R2
R3
]
.
Recall that R1(η˜), R4(η˜) and R5(η˜) are symmetric and
diagonal. So T1(η˜) and T2(η˜) are symmetric. Since R4(η˜)
and R5(η˜) are positive definite and diagonal, so T2(η˜) is
positive semi-definite. Recall R1(η˜) is positive definite. By
using λmin(A1 + A2) ≥ λmin(A1) + λmin(A2), we know
that T1(η˜) is positive definite. Hence, det(T1(η˜)) 6= 0 and
det(JM (η˜)) 6= 0. This implies that JM (η˜) is non-singular.
By (30) again, the determinant of JM (η˜) is computed as
follows:
λmin(JM (η˜)) ≥ λmin
( [ R4(η˜) 0
0 R5(η˜)
] )
λmin(T1(η˜))
≥ λmin(R1(η˜)) ≥ min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i}.
Recall that JM (η˜) is non-singular. By the inverse function
theorem, we reach that η˜(ζ) and J(η˜(ζ)) are continuously
differentiable in ζ and the derivative of η˜ with respect to ζ
is given by:
dη˜(ζ)
dζ
= J(η˜(ζ)). (31)
With the relation (31), we establish the derivative of
η˜(U(ξ(t))) with respect to t as follows:
dη˜(U(ξ(t)))
dt
=
dη˜(ζ(t))
dζ(t)
ζ˙(t) = J(η˜(ζ(t)))
dU(ξ(t))
dξ(t)
ξ˙(t),
where dU(ξ(t))dξ(t) is well-defined since U is smooth.
Remark 3.2: In the paper [6], a relation like (29) between
saddle-points and the parameter is derived from the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker condition. However, the results in [6] are not
applicable to our problem. Firstly, the Lagrangian functions
Li and H are merely concave in λ[i] and µ if , τ = 0.
Secondly, the paper [6] assumes that the state-dependent
matrix derived from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition is
uniformly non-singular. This is not easy to check a priori
and may lead to instability in our feedback setup. •
Lemma 3.4: The functions J(η)dU(ξ)dξ and ∇Ω are Lip-
schitz continuous with constant LJ > 0 and LΩ > 0,
respectively, over Y .
Proof: Note that JM (η)JM (η)−1 = I . Take the
derivative on η, and we have
dJM (η)
dη
JM (η)
−1 + JM (η)
dJM (η)
−1
dη
= 0.
This gives the following relations:
‖dJM (η)
−1
dη
‖ ≤ ‖JM (η)−1‖‖dJM (η)
dη
‖‖JM (η)−1‖
≤ (min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i})−2‖
dJM (η)
dη
‖,
where in the last inequality we use Lemma 3.3.
By (12), we derive the following relations:
‖dJ(η)
dη
dU(ξ)
dξ
‖ ≤ ‖dJM (η)
−1
dη
‖‖JN‖‖dU(ξ)
dξ
‖
≤ (min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i})−2‖
dJM (η)
dη
‖‖‖JN‖‖dU(ξ)
dξ
‖,
‖J(η)d
2U(ξ)
d2ξ
‖ ≤ ‖J(η)‖‖d
2U(ξ)
d2ξ
‖
≤ min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i}‖JN‖D(2)U . (32)
From (32), we reach the desired Lipschitz constant LJ on
J(η)dU(ξ)dξ over Y .
IV. REAL-TIME GAME THEORETIC COORDINATION
In this section, we will present an algorithm for the real-
time game theoretic coordination. It will be followed by the
convergence properties of the closed-loop system.
A. Algorithm statement
Denote by η˜(t) the NE of the CVX game parameterized
by ζ(t) = U(ξ(t)) where η˜(t) consists of
β˜(t) , ((β˜[i]κ (t))κ∈S)i∈V , α˜(t) , ((α˜
[i]
κκ′(t))(κ,κ′)∈ES)i∈V ,
µ˜(t) , (µ˜κ(t))κ∈{1,··· ,m}, λ˜(t) , ((λ˜[i]κ (t))κ∈{1,··· ,p})i∈V .
At each time t, each primal player i maintains the esti-
mates (βˆ[i]κ (t))κ∈S and (αˆ
[i]
κκ′(t))(κ,κ′)∈ES of (β˜
[i]
κ (t))κ∈S and
(α˜
[i]
κκ′(t))(κ,κ′)∈ES . Each dual player i maintains the estimates
(λ˜
[i]
κ (t))κ∈{1,··· ,p} of (λ
[i]
κ (t))κ∈{1,··· ,p}. The operator then
maintains the estimate µ(t) of µ˜(t).
The decision makers update their own estimates
by decreasing the distance to the instantaneous Nash
equilibrium η˜(t) and simultaneously following the
temporal variation of η˜(t). The update rules are
given in Algorithm 1. In particular, the quantity
v(t) , J(η(t), U(ξ(t)))dU(ξ(t))dξ(t) ξ˙(t) serves as the estimate
of dη˜(U(ξ(t)))dt in Lemma 3.3, and is decomposed into
(v
[1]
p (t)T , · · · , v[N ]p (t)T , vµ(t)T , v[1]d (t)T , · · · , v[N ]d (t)T )T
where v[i]p (t) (resp. v
[i]
d (t)) is assigned to primal (resp. dual)
player i and vµ(t) is assigned to the operator.
The quantities of βˆ[i](t) and αˆ[i](t) are intermediate
estimates and probably fails to enforce the constraint
v˙κ(t) = 0. To address this, each primal player i obtains
(α[i](t), β[i](t)) = Qi(b[i](t)) where β[i](t) = βˆ[i](t) and
α[i](t) is the orthogonal projection of αˆ[i](t) onto the set
Ξ[i](t) defined by:
Ξ[i](t) ,{α[i] ∈ R|ES| | Aα[i] = b[i](t),
α
[i]
κκ′ ∈ [a, α[i]max − a], (κ, κ′) ∈ ES}
where b[i]κ (t) = β
[i]
κ (t) −∑κ′∈Nκ aκ′κβ[i]κ′ (t) and b[i](t) =
(b
[i]
κ (t))κ∈S. After that, all the players in V implements
the control commands β[i]κ (t) and α
[i]
κκ′(t) in the queue
dynamics (3). Here, each primal player i prioritizes the
stabilization of the user queues, and enforces the constraint
v˙κ(t) = 0 by reallocating his empty vehicles.
Remark 4.1: The computation of the orthogonal projec-
tion can be encoded by the following quadratic program
which can be solved by a number of existing efficient
algorithms:
min
α[i]∈R|ES|
‖α[i] − αˆ[i](t)‖2
s.t. Aα[i] = b[i](t), α
[i]
κκ′ ∈ [a, α[i]max − a], (κ, κ′) ∈ ES.
If αmax is sufficiently large, the computation of the orthog-
onal projection can be greatly simplified. Let α[i](t) to the
projection of αˆ[i](t) onto the solution set of Aα[i] = b[i](t).
Notice that A is orthogonal to all the vectors in the plane of
Aα[i] = b[i](t). Then we have
A(Aαˆ[i](t)−Aα[i](t)) = αˆ[i](t)− α[i](t).
That is,
α[i](t) = αˆ[i](t)−A(Aαˆ[i](t)− b[i](t)).
•
The real-time game theoretic regulator is formally stated
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Real-time game theoretic coordinator
Require: Each primal (resp. dual) player i chooses the
initial state z[i](0) ∈ Zi (resp. λ[i](0) ∈ Λi). The
operator chooses the initial state µ(0) ∈M .
Ensure: At each time instant t ≥ 0, the decision makers
execute the following steps:
1: The operator generates the estimate v(t) =
J(η(t), U(ξ(t)))dU(ξ(t))dξ(t) ξ˙(t), and update µ(t) according
to the following rule:
µ˙(t) = PM [µ(t) + αDµ(t) + vµ(t)]− µ(t),
where α > 0 and Dµ(t) , ∇µH(z(t), µ(t), U(ξ(t))).
The operator then informs player i the information of
(v
[i]
p (t), v
[i]
d (t), µ(t)).
2: Each primal (resp. dual) player i updates z[i](t) =
(βˆ[i](t), αˆ[i](t)) (resp. λ[i](t)) according to the following
rule:
z˙[i](t) = PZi [z[i](t)− αD[i]z (t) + v[i]p (t)]− z[i](t),
λ˙[i](t) = PΛi [λ[i](t) + αD
[i]
λ (t) + v
[i]
d (t)]− λ[i](t),
where D[i]x (t) , ∇x[i]Li(z(t), µ(t), λ[i](t), U(ξ(t))) and
D
[i]
µ (t) , ∇µ[i]Li(z(t), µ(t), λ[i](t), U(ξ(t))).
3: Each player i generates and implements the control
commands (α[i](t), β[i](t)) = Qi(b[i](t)).
B. The closed-loop system and its performance analysis
The closed-loop system consists of the user queueing
network (3), (4), the vehicle queueing network (6) and the
real-time game theoretic coordinator (Algorithm 1). For the
sake of completeness, we summarize the closed-loop system
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 The closed-loop system
1: The dynamics of the user queueing network:
Q˙(t) = hQ(c(t), u(t)),
c˙(t) = hc(c(t), Q(t), t),
where the controller uκ(t) =
∑
i∈V β
[i]
κ (t) with
(α[i](t), β[i](t)) = Qi(b[i](t)).
2: The dynamics of the vehicle queueing network:
v˙κ(t) = 0.
3: The real-time game theoretic coordinator:
η˙(t) = PK [η(t)− αD(t) + J(η(t), ζ(t))dU(ξ(t))
dξ(t)
ξ˙(t)]
− η(t).
The following theorem summarizes the performance of the
closed-loop system.
Theorem 4.1: Suppose Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3
hold. Suppose the following holds:
ϑ ,
(
1− αρΩ + α2L2Ω + (LJD(1)u δξ)2
+ (1 + αLΩ)LJD
(1)
u δξ
) 1
2 < 1.
The estimates β[i](t) and α[i](t) generated by Algorithm 1
approximates η˜(t) = XRG(ζ(t)) in the way that
lim
t→+∞ ‖β
[i](t)− β˜[i](t)‖ → 0,
lim sup
t→+∞
‖α[i](t)− α˜[i](t)‖ ≤ ‖A‖ςG(, τ), (33)
Furthermore, the queue dynamics achieves the following:
lim sup
t→+∞
‖Qκ(t)− Q¯κ‖ ≤ max{∆min,∆max}, (34)
where ∆min , ln(1 + 2ςG(,τ)βmax−cmax−a (1 +
βmax−cmax−a
cmin
eQ¯κ))
and ∆max , − ln(1− 2ςG(,τ)βmax−cmax−a ).
Remark 4.2: Recall that ρΩ = min{mini∈V {ρi, ρ′i}, }
and δξ represents an upper bound on the maximum variation
of the user arrival rate. If δξ is smaller, we can choose a
set of smaller α,  and τ to satisfy ϑ < 1 and reduce the
right-hand sides of (33) and (34). That is, if the maximum
variation of the user arrival rates is smaller, the steady-state
system performance can be improved. •
Proof: We divide the proof into several claims.
Claim 1: It holds that ‖v(t)‖ ≤ δv for all t ≥ 0.
Proof: It is noted that
‖v(t)‖ ≤ ‖J(η(t), U(ξ(t)))‖‖dU(ξ(t))
dξ(t)
‖‖ξ˙(t)‖
≤ ‖JN‖D
(1)
u δξ
mini∈V {ρi, ρ′i}
= δv,
where we use Lemma 3.1, the relation (28) and Lemma 3.3.
Claim 2: It holds that µκ(t) ∈ [0,∆µ] and λ[i]κ (t) ∈
[0,∆λ] for all t ≥ 0.
Proof: The dynamics associated with µκ can be written
as follows:
µ˙κ(t) = −µκ(t) + dκ(t), (35)
where dκ(t) ∈ [0,∆µ] for all t ≥ 0. It is readily to see that
[0,∆µ] is an invariant set of (35) and thus µκ(t) ∈ [0,∆µ] for
all t ≥ 0. Analogously, one can verify that α[i]κ (t) ∈ [0,∆α]
for all t ≥ 0.
Claim 3: It holds that δ[i]β,min ≤ β[i]κ (t) ≤ δ[i]β,max and
δ
[i]
α,min ≤ α[i]κκ′(t) ≤ δ[i]α,max for all i ∈ V and t ≥ 0.
Proof: The dynamics associated with β[i]κ can be written
as follows:
β˙[i]κ (t) =
τ
β
[i]
κ (t)
− τ
βmax − β[i]κ (t)
+ d[i]κ (t), (36)
where
d[i]κ (t) = −∇β[i]κ fi(z
[i](t)) +
m∑
`=1
µ`(t)∇β[i]κ G`(β(t), U(ξ(t)))
+
p∑
`=1
λ
[i]
` (t)∇β[i]κ h
[i]
` (z
[i](t)) + v[i]κ (t).
Note that d[i]κ (t) ≤ dβ . Analogous to (P5) of Proposi-
tion 3.1, one can show that δ[i]β,min ≤ β[i]κ (t) ≤ δ[i]β,max.
Analogously, it holds that δ[i]α,min ≤ α[i]κκ′(t) ≤ δ[i]α,max.
Claim 4: It holds that µκ(t) ∈ [δµ,min, δµ,max] and
λκ(t) ∈ [δλ,min, δλ,max].
Proof: The dynamics associated with µκ can be written
as follows:
µ˙κ(t) = PM [µκ(t)− (µκ(t)−Gκ(β(t), ζκ(t))− τ
µκ(t)
)
+ vκ(t)]− µκ(t). (37)
Let u(t) = ∇Ω(η˜(t), ζ(t)), and χ(t) , dU(ξ(t))dξ(t) . From the
definition of K one can see that PK never applies and thus,
PK [η˜(t)− αu(t) + J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]
= η˜(t)− αu(t) + J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t).
This implies the following temporal evolution of η˜(t):
dη˜(t)
dt
= J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)
= PK [η˜(t)− αu(t) + J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]− η˜(t). (38)
The combination of Lemma 3.4 and Claims 5 and 6
implies that
‖J(η(t))− J(η˜(t))‖ ≤ LJ‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖, (39)
‖D(t)− u(t)‖ ≤ LΩ‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖. (40)
We recall the regulator for players as follows:
η˙(t) = PK [η(t)− αD(t) + J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]− η(t).
(41)
Choose the Lyapunov function candidate W (η(t), η˜(t)) ,
1
2‖η(t) − η˜(t)‖2 for system (41). The following claim pro-
vides an estimate of W˙ .
Claim 5: The following estimate holds:
W˙ ≤ 2(−1 + (ϑ+ σ) 12 )W + Υ(t), (42)
Proof: It follows from (38) and (41) that
W˙ = 〈η(t)− η˜(t), η˙(t)− dη˜(t)
dt
〉
= −‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖2 + Ψ(t), (43)
where the term Ψ(t) is given by:
Ψ(t) , 〈η(t)− η˜(t),
PK [η(t)− αD(t) + J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]
− PK [η˜(t)− αu(t) + J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]〉.
By the non-expansiveness property of PK , we have
‖PK [η(t)− αD(t) + J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]
− PK [η˜(t)− αu(t) + J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]‖2
≤ ‖(η(t)− η˜(t))− α(D(t)− u(t))
+ (J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)− J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t))‖2
≤ ‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖2 − α〈η(t)− η˜(t), D(t)− u(t)〉
+ α2‖D(t)− u(t)‖2
+ ‖J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)− J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)‖2
+ ‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖
× ‖J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)− J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)‖
+ α‖D(t)− u(t)‖
× ‖J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)− J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)‖. (44)
By the strong monotonicity, we have the following for the
second term on the right-hand side of (44):
〈η(t)− η˜(t),−(D(t)− u(t))〉 ≤ −ρΩ‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖2. (45)
We have the following for the last three terms on the right-
hand side of (44):
‖J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)− J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)‖
≤ LJ‖χ(t)ξ˙(t)‖‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖. (46)
Substitute (45), (40) and (46) into (44). After grouping,
we have the following:
‖PK [η(t)− αD(t) + J(η(t), ζ(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]
− PK [η˜(t)− αu(t) + J(η˜(t))χ(t)ξ˙(t)]‖2
≤ (1− αρΩ + α2L2Ω + L2J(D(1)u δξ)2
+ (1 + αLΩ)LJD
(1)
u δξ
)‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖2. (47)
This estimate further implies the following estimate of Ψ(t):
‖Ψ(t)‖ ≤ (1− αρΩ + α2L2Ω + L2J(D(1)u δξ)2
+ (1 + αLΩ)LJ(D
(1)
u δξ))
1
2 ‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖2. (48)
Claim 4 immediately implies that the following conver-
gence property:
lim
t→+∞ ‖η(t)− η˜(t)‖ = 0. (49)
From Proposition 3.1, it follows that η˜(t) ∈ XRG(ζ(t)) is
an approximation of XC(ζ(t)). Since the function [Gκ(·)]+
is continuous, thus it follows from Proposition 3.1 and (49)
that
lim sup
t→+∞
‖Gκ(x(t), ζ(t))‖ ≤ ςG(, τ). (50)
Hence, the controller for the queue network can be written
in the following way:
uκ(t) = Uκ(ξ(t)) + ∆κ(t), (51)
where the perturbation term ∆(t) satisfies
lim sup
t→+∞
‖∆κ(t)‖ ≤ ςG(, τ).
Claim 7: The relation (34) holds.
Proof: Consider the Lyapunov function candidate
Vκ(Qκ) =
1
2 (Qκ−Q¯κ)2. Its Lie derivative along (2) is given
by:
dVκ
dQκ
Q˙κ = (Qκ(t)− Q¯κ)Q˙κ
= (Qκ(t)− Q¯κ)(Uˆκ(ξ(t)) + ∆κ(t))
= (Qκ(t)− Q¯κ)
(
χ(e−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ) − 1) + ∆κ(t)
)
.
(52)
When Qκ(t)− Q¯κ ≥ ∆max, we have
βmax − cmax − a
1 + βmax−cmax−acmin e
−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ)
(e−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ) − 1) + ∆(t)
≤ (βmax − cmax − a)(e−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ) − 1) + ςG(, τ) ≤ −ςG(, τ).
Hence, the following holds for Qκ(t) − Q¯κ ≥ − ln(1 −
2ςG(,τ)
βmax−cmax−a ):
dVκ
dQκ
Q˙κ ≤ −ςG(, τ)∆max. (53)
Analogously, when Qκ(t)− Q¯κ ≤ −∆min, we have
βmax − cmax − a
1 + βmax−cmax−acmin e
−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ)
(e−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ) − 1) + ∆κ(t)
≥ βmax − cmax − a
1 + βmax−cmax−acmin e
−Q¯κ
(e−(Qκ(t)−Q¯κ) − 1)− ςG(, τ)
≥ ςG(, τ).
Hence, the following holds for Qκ(t)− Q¯κ ≤ −∆min:
dVκ
dQκ
Q˙κ ≤ −ςG(, τ)∆min. (54)
The combination of (53), (54) establishes the desired result
of (34).
This completes the proof for Theorem 4.1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a model of competitive
MoD systems and proposed a real-time game theoretic coor-
dination problem for the system. We have came up with an
algorithm to achieve vehicle balance and practical regulation
of the user queueing network.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Notations
In this section, we summarize the notations used in Sec-
tions III and IV.
1) Notations for Section III: Denote Zi , {z[i] ∈
Rni | β[i]κ ∈ [a, β[i]max − a], κ ∈ S, α[i]κκ′ ∈ [a, α[i]max −
a], (κ, κ′) ∈ ES}, Z ,
∏
i∈V Zi, Zˆi , {z[i] ∈ Rni | β[i]κ ∈
[0, β
[i]
max], κ ∈ S, α[i]κκ′ ∈ [0, α[i]max], (κ, κ′) ∈ ES} and
Zˆ ,
∏
i∈V Zˆi.
D
(1)
U , |S|(1 +
βmax − cmax + cmin2 −Na
(1 + 2βmax−cmax−Nacmin )
2
× 2(βmax − cmax −Na)
cmin
emaxκ∈S Q¯κ),
D
(2)
U ,
(βmax − cmax + cmin2 −Na) 2(βmax−cmax−Na)cmin
(1 + 2βmax−cmax−Nacmin )
4
× (1 + (2(βmax − cmax −Na)
cmin
emaxκ∈S Q¯κ)2)emaxκ∈S Q¯κ ,
g(s) , 1
2
(s+
√
s2 + 4τ),
δi , sup
z[i]∈Zi
fi(z
[i])− inf
z[i]∈Zi
fi(z
[i])
+ 2τ(|S|ψ(βmax) + |ES|ψ(αmax)),
ςh(, τ) , max
i∈V
√
(δi + (p− 1)τ),
ςG(, τ) , max
i∈V
√
N(δi + pτ),
δ′i , sup
z[i]∈Zi
‖∇
β
[i]
κ
fi(z
[i])‖
+ 2|S|max{g(−ςG(, τ)), g(ςG(, τ))}
+ 2|S|max{g(−ςh(, τ)), g(ςh(, τ))},
δ′′i , sup
z[i]∈Zi
‖∇
α
[i]
κκ′
fi(z
[i])‖
+ 2|S|max{g(−ςh(, τ)), g(ςh(, τ))}.
δv , (min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i})−1‖JN‖D(1)u δξ,
∆µ , g(ςG(, τ)) + (min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i})−1‖JN‖D(1)u δξ,
∆λ , g(ςh(, τ)) + (min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i})−1‖JN‖D(1)u δξ,
dβ , max
i∈V
sup
z[i]∈Zi
‖∇
β
[i]
κ
fi(z
[i])‖+ 2|S|(∆µ + ∆λ),
dα , max
i∈V
sup
z[i]∈Zi
‖∇
α
[i]
κκ′
fi(z
[i])‖+ 2|S|∆λ,
dµ , max
κ∈S
sup
z∈Z,ζκ∈[ cmin2 ,βmax−Na]
Gκ(β, ζκ) + δv,
dλ , max
i∈V
max
κ∈S
sup
z[i]∈Zi
h[i]κ (z) + δv.
δ
[i]
β,min ,
τβ
[i]
max
2τ + dββ
[i]
max
, δ
[i]
β,max = β
[i]
max −
τβ
[i]
max
2τ + dββ
[i]
max
,
δ
[i]
α,min ,
τα
[i]
max
2τ + dαα
[i]
max
, δ[i]α,max = α
[i]
max −
τα
[i]
max
2τ + dαα
[i]
max
,
δµ,min ,
τ
+ dµ
, δµ,max = ∆µ,
δλ,min ,
τ
+ dλ
, δλ,max = ∆λ,
Y , {η ∈ Rn | β[i]κ ∈ [δ[i]β,min, δ[i]β,max], α[i]κκ′ ∈ [δ[i]α,min, δ[i]α,max],
µ` ∈ [δµ,min, δµ,max], λ[i]κ ∈ [δλ,min, δλ,max]}.
LJ ,
√(
sup
η∈Y
‖dR1(η)
dη
‖)2 + 4τ2( m2
ς6G(, τ)
+
N2p2
ς6h(, τ)
)
× (min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i})−2‖JN‖D(1)U + min
i∈V
{ρi, ρ′i}‖JN‖D(2)U ,
LΩ , sup
η∈Y
‖d∇Ω(η)
dη
‖.
2) Notations for Section IV: We associate the incidence
matrix A ∈ R|S|×2|S| for the graph GS. In particular, the
κ-th row is assigned to state κ, and is in the form of
[aκ1 · · · aκ|S|, a1κ · · · a|S|κ]. If κ′ ∈ Nκ, then aκκ′ = −1;
if κ′ ∈ Nκ, then aκ′κ = 1; aκκ′ = 0, otherwise.
Λi , {λ[i] ∈ Rp | λ[i]κ ∈ [0,∆λ], ∀κ ∈ S},
M , {µ ∈ Rm | µκ ∈ [0,∆µ], ∀κ ∈ S}.
B. An instrumental result
The following lemma shows that the infinite-horizon
averages of two functions are identical if two functions
asymptotically approach to each other.
Lemma 6.1: Consider the functions f, g : R≥0 → R
which are uniformly bounded. If limt→+∞ ‖f(t)−g(t)‖ = 0,
then it holds that limT→+∞ ‖f¯(T ) − g¯(T )‖ = 0, where
f¯(T ) =
∫ T
0
f(t)dt
T and g¯(T ) =
∫ T
0
g(t)dt
T .
Proof: Pick any ε > 0, there is K ≥ 0 such that
‖f(t) − g(t)‖ ≤ ε for all t ≥ K. Then the following holds
for any T ≥ K
‖f¯(T )− g¯(T )‖ ≤
∫K
0
‖f(t)− g(t)‖dt
T
+
∫ T
K
‖f(t)− g(t)‖dt
T
≤
∫K
0
‖f(t)− g(t)‖dt
T
+
ε(T −K)
T
. (55)
Recall that f, g are uniformly bounded. Take the limit on
T in (55), and it renders that
lim sup
T→+∞
‖f¯(T )− g¯(T )‖ ≤ ε. (56)
Since (56) holds for any ε > 0, we then reach the desired
result.
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